Abstract: Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an auto Configuring network. Due to its natural characteristics, a MANET is vulnerable to many security threats. Blackhole attack compromises the performance and the reliability of the network. Since nodes are allowed to move freely within the network, it becomes very important to protect the communication among mobile nodes for the sake of security. In this paper we have investigated various techniques that can detect Blackhole attacks in MANET and we have compared the detection techniques with different matrices such as Average Packet Delivery ratio and Average End-To-End delay.
Introduction
Ad hoc networks are not centralized and are wireless networks. They are infrastructure less networks, suitable for situations where setting an infrastructure is either not feasible or is costly. Mingyan et al. (1999) , a mobile Ad hoc Network is dynamic in nature and in such a network nodes are allowed to move freely during the communication.
Nodes that are not in each other's vicinity, communicate with multi hop communication. Due to its characteristics the network is vulnerable to many security attacks and it is used in places where infrastructure networks do not work well like battle field, disaster management etc Sakshi (2014).
MANET security attacks are classified into Active Attack and Passive Attack. In a passive attack, the assault is not intended to destroy the operation of the protocol but to reveal the information of the network. An attacker may not change any message in passive attack. In an active attack, the messages may be modified by the attacker, however these attacks generally involve actions performed by various adversaries, modification of transmitted data, deletion of transmitted data etc. Attacks like impersonation, disclosure and Denial of Service attack are known as active attacks.
Impersonation
In impersonation first the assaulting node slips into the network by donning the identity of some other node and then transmits false routing information.
Disclosure
In disclosure the attacker node discloses the location information about the target node.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
In DoS attack, the attacker jams the network or overflows the routing table of the target node and continues to send false routing information (Radhika and 
Blackhole Attack
Blackhole attack is a prime security threat in MANET. In a black hole attack, an as assaulting node utilizes the protocols and misguides by revealing a shortest path to the desired node. But instead of forwarding the packets to its neighboring node, the malicious node eventually drops routing packets (Perkins and Royer, 1999; Maan et al., 2011) A blackhole assailant first assaults into the multicast forwarding group by instigating a rushing assault, keeping in mind the end goal of capturing the information group of the multicast session. The aggressor drops a few or the majority of the packets that it gets as opposed to sending the packets to the following nodes on the route. This sort of assault frequently brings about low packet delivery ratio Hoang and Uyen (2008) .
Ad hoc On-Demand Vector routing (AODV) protocol is probably the most famous MANET routing protocol. This protocol offers several benefits such as dynamic, self starting and multihop routing.
Furthermore, it is able to adapt MANET topology changes and can automatically reject the inactive routes, Perkins and Royer (1999) .
Sadly, AODV is prone to many routing assaults. (Maan et al., 2011; Ramaswamy et al., 2003) .
Blackhole attack is the one of the most severe attacks in AODV-based MANET, Ramaswamy et al. (2003) . In this assault false routing data is produced by the assailant and it is sent to the casualty nodes to cause false route entries in the routing tables of the nodes. Accordingly, numerous erroneous routing exist and cause bottleneck in the communication channels. Steering Protocols There are various directing conventions in MANET. In this segment, we will examine a portion of the renowned steering conventions.
Routing Protocols
MANET has a long list of routing protocols. In the following section, we will be discussing some of the routing protocols. Since the current routing information is not known so for that purpose prior communicating with a target node, the mobile node should broadcast its present status to the neighbors.
Routing protocols are classified on the basis of how the information is acquired. In the below classification we are going to discuss:
• Proactive Routing Protocol • Reactive Routing Protocol
Proactive (Table-Driven) Routing Protocol
The alternate identification for this protocol is tabledriven routing protocol. In proactive routing protocols, routing information is broadcasted to the neighbours. Every node keeps a routing table to keep a list of the adjacent nodes, reachable nodes and the number of jumps required. Thus every node has to evaluate the neighbourhood as long as the network topology is changing.
Hence there is a disadvantage of overhead rise because as the size of the network increases, communication overhead within a larger network topology also increases. Nonetheless, there is favorable position that the network status can be instantly reflected if any pernicious node joins the system. The Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) Tseng et al. (2011) , routing protocol and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol are some of the well known routing protocols Royer and Toh (1999) protocol (Ramaswamy et al., 2003; Deng et al., 2002) .
Reactive (on-demand) Routing Protocol
A reactive routing is actualized with on-request routing conventions. In opposition to the proactive routing that communicates the routing information; the reactive routing is just started when nodes want to transmit the information packets. A noteworthy preferred standpoint of this methodology is that there is a decreased wastage of data transfer capacity that is initiated from the cyclic broadcast. The shortcoming of these conventions is that passive routing technique prompts some packet loss. Here we quickly portray two renowned on-request routing protocols i.e. Ad hoc ondemand Distance Vector (AODV) Sanzgiri and Dahill (2002) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) Perkins and Bhagwat (1994) protocol.
In AODV, every node just records the following hop data in its routing table but keeps it for maintaining a routing way from source to destination node. If the target node can't be reached from the source node then a route discovery process will be initiated shortly.
Security Criteria
Earlier, encryption and firewalls were used to protect the network which did not prove much efficient for a MANET infrastructure, for the major concern in MANET security is integrity, authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, availability to mobile users and anonymity as described below.
Availability
Zhou and Haas (1999) Availability maintains the activeness of the network despite various attacks. Its major concern is the unauthorized and illegal access of resources. In some attacks, there could be possible disruption of routing protocol and continuity of services in the network.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality ensures protection from passive attacks. In military, the leakage of information can't be compromised. Confidentiality ensures authorized access of information that protects data. Even it ensures the confidentiality of router location and packet information.
Authentication
Zhou and Haas (1999) Authentication ensures that communicating parties are authorized parties by verifying their identity before communication. Ubiquitous networks need mutual authentication and for mutual authentication, a mutual authentication protocol is necessary to prevent the attacks.
Integrity
Integrity guarantees that message delivered is neither modified nor duplicated or reordered for replay of original message. It also ensures that only the authorized parties retrieve the information or messages and the message is not corrupted or lost. Integrity ensures that messages are delivered to the authorized parties as sent.
Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation makes sure that sending node can't challenge its previous communications. It can always be proved by the receiver that a particular message was sent by an alleged sender. It can also be used for isolation and detection of nodes.
Scalability
Although the security is not affected by the scalability directly but as the network may consist of hundreds or thousands of nodes and if the network is not scalable enough then new nodes cannot be added to the network. The attacker thus may compromise the newly added nodes and get access to the network.
Anonymity
This simply helps in ensuring the privacy of the personal information about the owner or user and it is not disclosed by the node.
Detection Techniques
Sukla (2008) proposed a mechanism that is able to remove and detect the malicious nodes. This approach comprises of an algorithm that as opposed to sending complete traffic information at a single purpose of time, send the traffic data in some little estimated blocks. In this way by guaranteeing an end-to-end checking, all the attacker nodes can be detected and evacuated in the middle of the transmission of two such little blocks. Before transmitting a response to any node, the initiating node sends a prelude messages to the target node to alert it about the upcoming information piece.
Traffic movement is observed by the neighboring nodes in the course. Destination node sends an acknowledgment after the finish of the transmission by means of a postlude message containing the aggregate number of information packets got by the destination node.
This information is further checked by the source node to see if the data loss is in tolerable range or not. If the data loss is very high then the process of detection is initiated and the malicious node is removed by aggregating the responses from the network and monitoring the contributing nodes.
Satoshi et al. (2007) proposed an anomaly detection technique that utilizes dynamic preparing strategy in which the preparation information is refreshed at standard interim of time where the Multidimensional component vector is recognized to express state and status of the network of every node. According to us here each dimension is counted on every time slot. It utilizes sequence number of the destination to identify assault. The feature vector likewise incorporates number of RREQ messages sent, number of RREP messages received and the normal of contrast of destination sequence number in each availability between succession number of RREP message and the one held in the list. Here mean time is figured by computing some numerical count. There is an assault when the separation is more prominent than some threshold value.
Shalini (2010) proposed a technique based on sending of data in terms of small packets of equal sized blocks instead of sending the complete data in one continuous flow. According to us in this technique the message flow is monitored independently at both source and destination node. The checked outcome is accumulated by the spine network of trusted nodes. As per result every node can locally keep up their own particular table of malicious or boycotted nodes and at whatever point a malicious node endeavors to send information to any genuine node, it can likewise caution the system about the malicious or boycotted nodes. This list of malevolent nodes might be utilized to find secure ways from source node to destination node by maintaining a strategic distance from various black nodes acting in participation.
Anishi (2013) has proposed MEAODV (Modified Enhanced AODV) that depends on the past work of EAODV (Enhanced AODV). According to our survey and study, the MEAODV depends on route discovery procedure to relieve the impacts of the black hole assaults. It has couple of various condition parameters for checking the RREP messages for better course disclosure system however has a comparable rationale as in EAODV. In simulation, by fluctuating nodes, it offers preferable PDR over EAODV. It can be reasoned that MEAODV has remarkable outcomes as far as better Performance Delivery Ratio (PDR) and less End-to-End Delay as contrast with EAODV strategy. Sanjay et al. (2013) , with the control packets called CONFIRM, CHCKCNFRM and REPLYCONFIRM, they have effectively distinguished the nearness of Black Hole and thus effectively occupied all the traffic from it. According to our study, here even a slight modification in the protocol shows that how single run of the algorithm can detect the presence of collaborative Black Hole chains. They were also able to detect time varying and target varying Black Holes called the gray Holes with slight modifications in our method which produces 90 percent DDR for dynamic topology with an end to end delay, 0.9 times greater than that of conventional AODV. So, simulation results also show that algorithm is packet traffic efficient as well as time efficient.
Rutvij (2013) have investigated on many existing approaches on how to tackle Blackhole and Grayhole attacks and have discussed their previous work. Here they have presented the slightly altered improved protocol viz. MRAODV which is based on their previous work viz. R-AODV that removes the limitations in the existing mechanisms. According to us in the purposed approach during the route discovery phase MR-AODV isolates Blackhole and Grayhole nodes as R-AODV and sets up a new secure route to send the data. It attempts to lessen the normalized routing overhead by diminishing the number of forwarded reply packets which are sent by the adversary nodes. A simulation result which has been presented in form of graphs proves that the MR-AODV is the reliable solution which under various network parameters and traffic conditions gives the considerable enhancement in PDR with acceptable average end-to-end delay and normalized routing overhead.
Sakshi and Khuteta (2015), researchers proposed a modification on Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV). In this AODV act like a self initiating routing protocol for MANETs. According to us in this purposed mechanism the security of this protocol is degraded with a particular type of attack know as "Blackhole" attack. In such type of attack the malicious node advertise itself as having the best path to destination while discovering route therefore interrupt the real communication and degrade network performance. In the proposed plot it has been conveyed that the base node in the system that builds the likelihood of distinguishing different vindictive nodes in system and further disconnect them from participating in any correspondence.
Vaishali and Lata (2015), to maintain a strategic distance from single blackhole attack in MANET. According to us they have considered a component that utilizations further Route Request packets. For distinguishing and evading agreeable blackhole attack they propose another method which utilizes Cooperative Cluster Agents. In this particular scheme they pass DRI and SRT-RRT tables as a contribution to Cooperative Security Agents. In view of these sources of info the CSAs utilize cross checking and location stream instruments for recognizing helpful blackhole attack, once it is identified that can be maintained a strategic ca can be maintained distance from by passing ready warning in the MANET. For execution of the proposed conspire they will utilize organize test system -ns-2.35 the proposed arrangement and contrast it and standard AODV protocol as far as throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay.
Ayesha et al. (2015) in investigated scheme, each and every node in the network environment entertains its neighboring hopes promiscuously. According to us here in promiscuous mode, every node monitors the packet being forwarded by its neighbors in order to observe the behavior of neighbor regarding packet operation. Every node compares the neighbor information with the information it stores in its knowledge table. If both are same the node assumes that the packet is forwarded further, otherwise node waits for particular amount of time and checks the reasons for packet dropping. In order to confirm packets are sent to its neighbor, the nodes monitor the control packets as well as data packets to prevent selective dropping, as black hole attack drops selected packets. In order to monitor the forwarded packets, every node has to maintain knowledge tables with following entries: Fm, rm if the values differ, the nodes are black hole nodes. A secure knowledge algorithm for mitigating black hole attack in AODV protocol has been recommended. The algorithm monitors the data packets that are being forwarded in promiscuous mode to ensure that the packets are delivered to destination node. If any node drops a packet our algorithm checks for the packet drop reasons first before declaring it as a black hole node, thereby preventing a trusted node to act as if it is a blackhole node.
Mohamed and Peter (2016) presents another idea of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) in which distinguishing a pernicious interloper is refined by consenting to the ordinary convention conduct and baits the malevolent node to produce an acknowledgment of its malignant conduct. According to us in this proposed idea a Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM) oppose such attacks that can be consolidated into any responsive directing convention has been proposed. Which doesn't require costly cryptography or confirmation instruments, yet depends on privately connected timer and thresholds to group nodes as pernicious. No changes to the packets configurations are required, so the overhead is a little measure of computation at nodes and no additional correspondence.
Thi and Yeo (2016) for identifying the individual bad conduct, they characterized sending proportion metrics that can recognize the behaviors of assailants from typical nodes. According to us in this the malevolent nodes may abstain from being distinguished by conniving to control their sending proportion metrics. To constantly drop messages and advance the metrics in the meantime, aggressors need to make fake experience records habitually and with high manufactured quantities of delivered responses they misuse the anomalous example of appearance recurrence and number of sent messages in fake experiences to outline a vigorous calculation to identify intriguing aggressors.
Jitendra and Vinit (2014) proposed a novel cluster situated idea is proposed to improve security and proficiency of the system. According to us in this procedure safeguards the ideal execution of MANET in nearness of dark opening attack. The reenactment of the proposed technique is completed utilizing NS2 organize test system and the simulation results reflects the performance of scheme for detection and deterrence for the attack blackhole.
Arun (2016), proposed a mechanism on MANET or Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks that are self-forming systems which do not require a settled framework for its communication. According to us in this mechanism the MANET is assumed as a basic part in Military Communication and Disaster Management framework. At first there will be different nodes with discrete address relegated from an address pool, which will frame the system when required. The typical security components like encryption and confirmations have no enormous parts in these sorts of attacks. The paper talk about the FPGA execution of black hole warm hole recognition and avoidance algorithm. The packets from a black hole or wormhole are detected in the MAC-Physical layer itself by arbitrarily changing the Packet Travel Time (PTT). The Mac layer and the physical layer are actualized using Partial-Reconfiguration procedure so that the symbol rate, modulation scheme and coding rate can be changed haphazardly while the framework is running without utilizing additional equipment. Probe request and probe reaction messages are utilized to guarantee verification for the nodes for shaping the system. Rathiga and Sathappan (2016) in this hybrid approach, the initiated monitor nodes gather the bundle stream information about the neighboring nodes. According to us in this hybrid approach at the point the distance metric is registered utilizing which two location thresholds are resolved. Distance metric for all the nodes is compared with very first threshold. On the off chance that the distance metric of a node is more noteworthy than the principle threshold, then the node is thought to be malevolent nodes. On the off chance that the distance metric of the nodes are beneath the second threshold but not less than principal threshold, the nodes are set apart as grey hole assailants while in the event that they are more noteworthy than the second threshold, the nodes are set apart as black hole aggressors. Exploratory outcomes demonstrate that the proposed hybrid black/grey hole detection approach recognizes and wipes out the attacks adequately with better throughput, packet drop rate, packet delivery ratio and routine overhead.
Neha and Anand (2016) Black-hole and gray-hole attack is one sort of attack which damages and attacks on MANET. According to us According to us in this attack the malevolent (undesirable node) occupy the information packets that it feels is having most brief and the freshest course to the goal node so sender advances every one of the information packets to it. In the wake of getting the information packets, it drops them to make a Denial of administration attack or procedures to concentrate data from the packet. Here a method is being proposed for identification of the black-hole or malicious node. In this strategy, another system a sort of trap technique is included in AODV protocol for the recognition of malignant nodes. At the point when the Black-hole node is distinguished after that a disturbing strategy is activated to make different nodes mindful of vindictive nodes.
Countermeasures
The primary distress in MANET is the safety of communication and soundness of information. A network may have one or more vulnerabilities which can be exploited by an action called attack. It is necessary in network to perform routing and packet forwarding. Several detection techniques have been devised to reduce the effect of the assaults on the environmental paradigm. Preventive and Reactive mechanisms are the type of mechanisms that are used for the protection of MANET.
Mitigation Techniques against Black Hole Attack
The Network Layer are more likely to be exploited as this layer is more vulnerable for attacks than any layer in MANET. Various security threats are imposed on this layer Sanzgiri et al. (2002) . For the security maintenance, one way is to use the secure routing protocol. Source authentication is used to evoke the routing responses. The Message Authentication Codes (MAC), Digital signatures and Hashed MACs (HMAC), these approaches are used to maintain security at some predefined level. By the use of IPSec, security can be achieved at the network layer in internet. Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks (ARAN) is one more additional routing protocol which gives the security and shelter from Blackhole attacks. This routing protocol is used where there are a number of threats and possibilities of change in sequence number, hop count modification and change in source routing and mockery of target addresses Deng et al. (2002) .
Mitigation Approach by Deng
This approach makes some changes in the AODV protocol to avoid the blackholes. This approach is used for identification of the existence of the advertised Route of the black hole by appending in Route reply (RREP) packets of the intermediate node by their position of the near to next node. After encountering the route reply (RREP) packet from a transitional node, source node collects the information of the next hop node and sends supplementary request to the one jump node for checking the routing metric value with the one jump node. For confirming the route information next hop node of neighbor sends back the supplementary reply packet to the sender. In case the source does not get back this supplementary reply, it specifies that the route contains the malicious nodes. This route is dropped from the distinct routing table and an alarm signal is forwarded to other side nodes in the environment to isolate malicious nodes. The limitations of this policy is that cooperative black hole attacks can be initiated on it. Furthermore, this solution causes additional routing overhead due to supplementary request and supplementary reply for verification.
Mitigation via Destination Sequence Number
The investigated approach by Mistry et al. (2009) gives the approach that source node verifies the RREP destination sequence number by analyzing the RREP messages which arrive within the fixed and an unequivocal time period. If sequence number is found to be greater than desired, then the initiating node of the respective RREP will be identified as malicious node due to the high sequence number. The major issue in this method is the latency time during the route discovery process. Before the process of routing table modernization the source node has to halt until the limit of time period is crossed. The node still suffers from the latency even if there is no attack in the network. 
Mitigation by Securing Routing

Mitigation by Using Optimal Path Routing and Hash
Hizbullah et al. (2013) A trivial moderation in AODV can elude the blackhole attack. In this technique, the sender node originally works as per the AODV routing protocol. It sends Route Request (RREQ) from initiating node to terminating node. As soon as the destination node or intermediate nodes receive the Route Request (RREQ), they send back Route Reply (RREP) messages on the same route from which they have received the RREQ messages by the previous node or the source node. Also for the avoidance of black hole the first RREP message coming from intermediate node is always discarded when the source node sends RREQ to the neighbour node. Here, the second shortest route is preferred over the first shortest route for the transmission of the packets and data. This solution presents the prevention of the network from attack called black hole by using the second shortest path for sending packets to destination. It would not be easy for black hole or grayhole node to monitor the entire network topology and examine where to place themselves in the network and mislead the source node that it has the second shortest route node to the destination. The attack can comfortably be ignored by using this technique as the affected node was not in practice for sending RREP message of the second shortest route to the source node as the malicious node usually generates the RREP message of high sequence number to be treated as the first shortest route node.
Time-Based Limen Mitigation Detection Mechanism
Tamilselvan et al. (2007) gives the solution for the detection of black hole and ensuring the reliability of the route before sending the data packets over it. This solution provides the modification of AODV protocol for obtaining the desired goals as follows: The source node does not start sending data packets immediately after awarded the RREP message from any middle ware node. It ensures the safe route for sending data packets by waiting to receive the RREP messages from other neighboring nodes. A timer is then set by the source node for collecting the RREP messages from the neighbouring nodes and maintaining a table for all the received RREP messages. When the times get over, source node is considered and selects the most reliable route for packet transmission which contains the more repeated common nodes from the table. If no repeated common nodes are found, then the source node considers the route which provides information about its next hop in the route. It has a drawback of processing delay and wait strategy for waiting for the reply from neighboring node.
Simulation and Results
The Simulation is performed via NS-3 Network Simulator and the Table 1 summarizes all the simulation parameters.
In G-AODV with the help of control packets called CONFIRM, CHCKCNFRM and REPLYCONFIRM and has diverted traffic from it. MRAODV, ADHOC routing are prone to various attacks such as DoS attack. This is only due to ignorance of security aspect during their designs. MEAODV migrates the black hole attack by controlling the routing update with new condition, parameter and removing the redundancy in detecting malicious nodes. TAPPING-AODV gives the facility to choose the best solution for the routing protocol and also provides the knowledge on how to use those schemes in any environment. Average Packet Delivery Ratio is the mean proportion of the received data packets by the receiving node and the total number of packets prompted by the source node. Here in the Fig. 1 as the number of Malicious nodes increase PDR of standard AODV under all parameters starts declining. There is very sharp decline in TAPPING-AODV, the performance of G-AODV is better than the TAPPING-AODV as the decrease in PDR, also the performance result shows that G-AODV performance is slightly low as compared to MR-AODV. There is very small decrease in PDR in MR-AODV as it does not breakout under attack and isolates all the malicious nodes and its performance is better than the other four and gives approx 87% PDR in this case.
Average End-to-End Delay refers to the average time taken to transmit packet from source node to destination node. Here in this figure we can observe that there is an increment in the end-to-end delay as the number of malicious nodes rises in the network. This is because when the packets are transmitted from the source node to the destination node, whenever malicious nodes are found, an algorithm is called either to drop that packet or to start the packet transmission right from the initial state. This ingest time period whenever a malicious node is countered, emanating in a swelled average end-to-end delay. In Fig. 2 we can conclude that the average ETE Delay is increasing in all. Tapping AODV has the maximum ETE Delay than other four and MR-AODV has the minimum ETE Delay than all the other four.
Average Throughput is the total amount of packets successfully transmitted from source node to destination in a particular time. In Fig. 3 we can see that the average throughput is decreasing as the number of malicious node is increasing. Here we have concluded that the BHAODV (Black hole AODV) attack has the minimum throughput. This is because a large amount of packets are dropped during the transmission of packets, so in this attack the number of malicious nodes in the network increases which shows considerable increment in dropping of packets. MRAODV and MEAODV detection technique has the maximum Average throughput which indicates that these two detection technique is the best among all when we use this technique because there is very less packet drop. Detection Rate is the ratio of the total number of nodes attacked to the total number of attacks in the network that have been detected.
.
No of Detected Attacks Detection Rate
Total Attack = In the Fig. 4 , it can be seen that there is an increment in the detection rate as the number of malicious nodes increases. The probability of detection of attack increases as the size of the blackhole increases. Tapping AODV detection technique has the least detection rate which shows it is not capable of detecting the attacks on node on large scale. MEAODV and MRAODV has the highest detection rate i.e. they are capable of detecting the maximum attack in the network. 
Conclusion
As per the simulation outcome performance of AODV is slightly more efficient than the tapping AODV.
IN MRAODV, during route discovery phase MRAODV isolates Black hole and sets up a secure route for the transmission of the data. It also attempts to reduce normalized overhead by decreasing the number of the forward reply packets which have been sent by the adversaries. Simulation result which has been presented in the form of graphs proves that MR-AODV is a reliable solution that gives significant improvement under various parameter and varied traffic states in PDR with moderate average end-to-end delay.
In GAODV, slight modification in the protocol can show that a single run algorithm can detect the presence of Black Hole, also with the modification in their method they have also achieved the success in detection of time varying and target varying black holes. Their simulation result also shows that their algorithm is packet traffic efficient as well as time efficient.
In MEAODV PDR increases comparatively on increasing the number of nodes, but end-to-end delay fluctuates. Here we have concluded that the AODV with MEAODV methods give comparatively better performance.
According to the above study we have concluded that the ME-AODV and MRAODV detection techniques are the best detection technique as they provides the best solution for mitigating black hole attack by controlling the routing update with new condition parameter and removing the redundancy in detecting malicious nodes and varying different parameters.
MRAODV and MEAODV detection techniques have the maximum Average throughput which indicates that these two detection techniques are the best among all when we use these techniques because there is very less packet drop.
MEAODV and MRAODV have the highest Detection rate i.e., they are capable of detecting the maximum attack in the network due to the increase in the black hole attack that the hop count of the neighbor.
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INTRODUCTION
Unreliable wireless communication links, continuously varying network topologies, limited bandwidth, higher power consumption, low computation power etc are the unique features of MANETs. Addition to these characteristics few security features that are either absent or less severe in wired networks, are introduced to increase the flexibility in MANETs. Mobile Ad-hoc networks are generally prone to several attacks such as passive eavesdropping, denial of service (DOS), impersonation, active interference, etc. Strong authentication and redundant transmission are the intrusion prevention measures that should be implemented by the intrusion detection techniques to monitor these networks and detect any malicious behavior of the nodes. Vulnerabilities in routing protocols are the most concerned issues in MANETs. Such vulnerabilities arise issues such as if any participating node is compromised, it becomes difficult to detect their malicious behaviors easily. New routing packets Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. can be introduced by such nodes which can further affect the network in various ways like flooding routing traffic, changing routing information etc, that results in Byzantine network failure. Mobile Nodes and MANETs are created spontaneously which have varying locations and are vulnerable to attack. The aim of our research work is to evaluate and implement the frequent attacks using a compatible and comparative methodology. The overall effect of each attack is thoroughly studied depending upon a range of performance metrics using several combinations of parameter sets.
There are several reasons behind the vulnerability attacks, they are supported by dynamic topology creation of MANETs which allow the system to become vulnerable against security threats. Node mobility in MANET causes frequent changes of the network topology.
The remainder of this paper is followed as: Section 2 provides a brief about related work; Section 3 addresses different attacks in MANET; Section 4 describes the simulation process with the help of performance metrics and discussion of the result analysis; Section 5 states the conclusion of the paper.
RELATED WORK
Several attacks have been proposed against the MANET environment as well as protocols which detect and prevent them. The popular attacks among them are Black-hole, Worm-hole and Sybil attacks. The basic concept behind the black-hole attack is that it generates and transmits incorrect routing information to attract traffic [1] . In this context, the attack arises the problem of incorrect routes and congestion in the communication channels. Similarly Worm-hole attack draws attention of all the network traffic by publicizing false information about the shortest path through it. The attack not only delays the packets to be routed through it but it also drops the throughput. Wormhole attack can be detected by spontaneous unexpected changes in the path length or delays in the packets to be transmitted from source node to the destination node [7] . Worm-hole attacks can be set up easily according to paper [8] . Generally, attackers arrange at least two transceivers at different locations to perform a wormhole attack on the wireless network. In addition attacker can easily perplex router to pass control to the Worm-hole. Doucour in the paper [5] introduced the Sybil attack. According to the research work, a malicious node can produce and regulate a huge number of virtual identities of different nodes which perplexes that several real nodes are present but actually only one node exists.
ATTACKS IN MANET
Black-hole attack:
In black-hole attack, a malicious node publicizes itself to have a shortest path to the destination node or to the data packet it wishes to obstruct by misusing its routing protocol. The malicious node drops all the data packets it receives from the network and generally causes very low packet delivery ratio. In this kind of attack, fake routing messages are delivered by the malicious node claiming a favorable route. It motivates other good nodes to route their data packets through this malicious one. The hostile node, instead of inspecting its routing table, makes its fresh routes available to malicious node. The attacker node sends the Route Request to the hostile node and when it gets reply, it obstructs the data packets and retains them [2] . The problem arises when the attacking node without inspecting its routing table publicizes and makes available its routing table. Thus, hostile node responds to Route Request and deflects the routing packets and retains them [11] . Generally in the routing protocols based on the concept of flooding, the response of real node is received before the reply of attacking node, thus a malicious and fake route is created. Now it depends on the node whether it has to discard the data packets or deliver it to the mysterious address [10] . A malicious node, in black-hole attack, allure all the data packets by claiming a fresh route to the destination and swallow them without delivering them to the destination thus performing a kind of denial-of-service(DOS) attack. The hostile node diverts the destination by delivering a false RREP(Route Reply) and pretends that it has a fresh route least hop count to destination and discards all the received data packets [6] . In figure 1 , the node C behaves like a Black-hole attacking node which generates a forged RREP packet to source node A that starts to transmit data after getting very first RREP from malicious node C. Now node A wants to communicate with Node D but the malicious node C discards the data traffic after getting it by source node A.
Black-hole in the MANETs falsely claims that it always route data packets in the network but contrary, it drops the traffic in the route to decrease the reliability. It has two working principles, firstly it has to exploit the routing protocol currently used by MANETs by publicizing that the black-hole (Node) has a fresh route, secondly it absorbs data traffic without further forwarding.
Wormhole attack:
In Worm-hole attack, generally two terms are introduced: Worm-hole Hit and Worm-hole tunnel. Two attackers and a Worm-hole tunnel form a Worm-hole hit. A direct communication link is created by attackers between them, referred as Worm-hole tunnel. Worm-hole tunnels can easily be established by either a wired link, a virtual link through encapsulation of data packets or a wireless out of band communication link of high quality. One of the attackers receives and replicates the packets from the surrounding nodes and then forecasts them through Worm-hole tunnel to another attacker. The former node replays the received tunnel packets to the neighboring nodes into the network. This attack is the popular deceiving attack in MANETs, also known as tunneling attack.
In a Worm-hole attack, the two attacker nodes are connected via a medium that is unrevealed to the real nodes. Such nodes can communicate with each other with the help of this out of band medium in which real nodes cannot. The two attacking nodes pretend in such a way that they seem to be neighbor to all the other real nodes in the network.
Worm-hole attack is one of the severe vulnerability attacks found in wireless Ad-hoc networks [3] . It can remarkably obstruct the communication across the network. This attack can be performed without concerning the underlying network routing protocol or deploying any cryptographic techniques. Thus this attack is very hard to detect in any underlying network.
In Worm-hole attack, one of the paired malicious nodes collects data packets in the network, "tunnels" these packets to the other paired node and then replays. A single attacker node is sufficiently capable of performing this kind of attack by, for instance, broadcasting Route Requests to real nodes. But the attack performed by more than one attacker node is considered more severe problem in wireless Ad-hoc networks. In this situation, malicious nodes can tunnel packets to each other by using an out-of-band link or by enclosing them. Once Worm-hole attack is accomplished in the network, attackers can use the same for traffic analysis.
In figure 2 , it is shown that Node C,D,G behave as Malicious nodes and the tunnel is created in between C to G so they are called as tunnel endpoint. Node D is known as Relay node which alter the traffic between one node to another. The traffic passing through C to G pass through Node E or can take another route. Here the source node is A, that wants to communicate to node H. H is the destination node, Node A,F,I,E,H are uncompromised nodes. If node A selects the Path A-F-I-E-H then the number of hops is higher than the Route A-B-D-H or A-C-E-H so for selecting shortest path A chose the minimal Hop Path and here it meets with the malicious node and the attack is performed.
Worm-hole attack is an attack on the routing protocol by exploiting vulnerabilities of the routing protocol in a Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET). A Worm-hole provides platform to an attacker to create two attacker-controlled check points which can be exploited by the attacker to discard or miss route data traffic at a certain time of period.
Sybil Attack:
In MANETs, every node needs a unique identifying address to participate in the routing process. An attacker node can take advantage of this flaw for sending packets, for instance, RREQ or RREP using fake ids, this kind of attack is known as Sybil Attack [4] . In Sybil attack, the attacker prohibits the legitimate nodes to use their addresses by pretending to be a huge number of nodes in the network; it can elude from detection mechanisms and also can "vote out" the real nodes in cooperative tasks such as Byzantine failure. This attack can severely harm those routing protocols which are spread in geographical areas and can even alarm multiple path routing mechanisms and node localization [12] . The Sybil Attack demonstrates itself by allowing attackers to compromise the network by generating and regulating huge number of fake ids [9] .
In Fig 3 , malicious node is represented by D and Sybil nodes are (X,Y,Z). If the malicious node D interacts with any other node in the network by forging all of its identities, the legitimate node gets confused whether it is communicating with four different nodes. But actually there is existing one physical node only with multiple IDs.
In Sybil attack, the attackers use multiple replica of identities or use the identity of any real node, currently present in the network to disrupt the communication or reduce the trust of legitimate nodes in the network. The need of a permanent, unique and distinct identity for each node are primary requirements for their security protocols, due to this Sybil attacks create a harmful threat to the Manet.
SIMULATION AND RESULTS:
The Simulation is executed using NetworkSimulator-3 (NS-3). Mobility scenarios are generated using Random way 
Performance Metrics
Following metrics are used in our study:
Average packet delivery ratio (APDR)
The number of data packets actually received by the receiver over the number of data packets which a sender transmits is known as packet delivery ratio (PDR) of a receiver. Average PDR taken over all receivers is known as APDR.
Average end-to-end delay (AEED)
EED or end to end delay for a packet can be defined as time taken by a packet to travel from source node to destination node. Average EED is the average of all EEDs which is taken over received packets.
Normalized Routing Overhead (NRO)
The NRO of a packet can be defined as ratio of routing packets sent to the routing packets received.
Figure 4: Average EED with increase in network size
The effect on end-to-end delay of various attacks (i.e., blackhole, wormhole and sybil) is analyzed (in terms of number of nodes) with increase in network size . In this case the number of attackers are kept fixed (five) and the network size is varied. As it can be seen from figure 4 that when the network is less dense the effect of attacks is lower as compared to when the network is medium dense. This is because due to low number of nodes in an area, the probability that the attacker becomes part of the discovered route decreases, therefore the effect of attack also decreases. If the node density is very high then also due to too many nodes in the possible route between a source-destination pair the probability that an attacker becomes part of an active route is very low.
Figure 5: Average PDR with increase in network size
Due to the above mentioned reasons of which tells how the node density affects the attackers in the network. Figure 5 shows the effect of analyzed attacks on the packet delivery ratio of the network with varying network density. With low density the attackers has very low effect on the network PDR because they are unable to exploit the route discovery process. As the network density increases the attackers become far efficient and the PDR of the network starts dropping. The routing overhead caused by the control packets and route breaks are considered as the overhead in routing. Figure 6 shows that the overhead in routing increases with increasing number of network nodes because with large number of nodes the broadcast messages used for route discovery will be large in number. The attacks will have lower effect on routing overhead as compared to the EED and PDR metrics because the routes including the attacker nodes are small and the packet drops caused by the attackers are not notified to their source nodes. Due to which source nodes are unable to do re-routing which shows low overhead even when the PDR is high.
Figure 7: Average EED with increasing number of attackers
The ratio of source-destination pair is fixed (i.e., five sessions) while the effect of attackers on various network parameters is enhanced due to the increasing number of attackers. As shown in Figure 7 the average end-to-end network delay increases due to increasing number of attackers because the attacks will either drop the packets or move them in a loop before sending them to its destination. As it can be seen from the figure 7 that delay is worse in case of Sybil attack when compared to other two attacks. This is because in Sybil attack the attacker creates virtual identities of itself and might rotate the packet to false next hop nodes that are not present in the network before the packet reaches to its destination. As the number of Sybil attackers increases, the delay also increases due to increase in the Sybil nodes on the selected data transmission route.
Figure 8: Average PDR with increasing number of attackers
The effect on PDR of the blackhole, wormhole and Sybil attacks are depicted in figure 8 with increased number of attacks. As shown in figure 8 , the drop in PDR is very sharp with the increase in number of attackers. As the number of attackers increase, the probability of the discovery of route also increases. The PDR of Wormhole and Sybil attack is very low. In wormhole the increase in number of attacker tunnels will greatly affect the communication process by capturing all possible routes between the source-destination pairs. While in Sybil attack, with the increasing number of attackers the number of virtual nodes also increases greatly which decreases the PDR of the network. Finally, In figure 9 , the effect of various comparing attacks on the overhead in routing with increased number of attackers in the network is observed. The Routing overhead increases for all comparing attacks with increasing number of attackers but this is not very high except in case of Sybil attack. This is because in Sybil attack when the packet is forwarded to a virtual node that packet drops due to the non-existence of the next hop node. With increasing number of Sybil attackers the range of virtual nodes increases greatly which increases the routing overhead caused by rerouting processes.
CONCLUSION
In this research work, we have implemented and analyzed three major attacks namely Blackhole, Wormhole and Sybil attack. With the help of large number of simulation processes the working methodology of these attacks along with their potential effect on network performance parameters are evaluated. The simulation results has proven that the Sybil attack is more influential one when compared with blackhole and wormhole attack because it's method of creating false identities is hard to avoid during the route discovery process. The wormhole attack is more effective than blackhole attack due to its collusion method of attack. The simulations results show that the important metric is PDR which gets affected most by these attacks and cause high damage to the communication process. In future, we will develop effective methods to counter these attacks by detecting and avoiding them. INTRODUCTION Ad hoc networks are wireless infrastructure-less networks. They are suitable where setting infrastructure is either not feasible or is costly. The most interesting feature of ad hoc network is that the functions of components that provide infrastructure like switches, routers, etc are performed by nodes present in the network. [1] All mobile hosts in MANET operate without centralized infrastructure. Sometimes due to radio power limitation and channel utilization, host to host communication may take place in a multi hop fashion, where each mobile host acts as a router. [2] MANETs are used for military applications such as ensuring the timely flow of information and command in battle since the 1970s. Due to fast and easy deployment they are also used to establish communication and provide rescue services after floods or earthquakes. MANETs are also used for on-the-fly collaborative computing outside an office environment. They are also used in communication dispatch systems for taxis to guide the route, inform about passengers pickups, etc. Lastly they are also used in personal networking like cell phones, PDAs, etc. MANETs can be easily attacked by attacking any one of the physical, MAC, network layers. [3] Wireless transmission and portable computing devices have made anytime anywhere communication possible, i.e. even while moving round the world we can stay connected with rest of the world. Mobile computing or sometimes called nomadic computing is a lot advantageous over wired communication. In wired system the communication is depended on the wired backbone infrastructure and fixed base stations. This may sometimes be unavailable due to physical or natural reasons. Cost may also be infeasible. [4] [5] [6] [7] Due to nodes mobility and dynamic topology MANET is highly vulnerable to attacks. The Intrusion Detection System is a method that analyzes and monitors the network activities. IDS can be run in two ways. Firstly, running IDS on each mobile node separately checks local traffic and helps in communicating local intrusion information to other nodes. It can also be used to check malicious neighbor. Secondly, in case of global IDS (used for cluster of mobile nodes) intrusion detection is the job of head node. [8] These intrusion detection systems have been in use since last three decades. In spite of the fact that networking paradigm has shifted from fixed to wireless in last decades, IDS is still the basic layer of defence. Although network firewall implementation is complex in MANET, IDS is the first layer of defence. [9] [10] Security in MANET is the most important concern. Many features of MANET make it vulnerable to security attacks. These features include open medium, changing its topology dynamically, lack of central monitoring and management, cooperative algorithms and no clear defence mechanism. [15] The reason for MANETs popularity is its dynamic, infrastructure less and scalable nature. Still it is very much exposed to attacks. Wireless links make it easier for the attacker to get access to ongoing communication. [16] [17] [18] The sender always wants to send data as fast as possible and securely to the receiver. Attackers take advantage of this and advertise themselves to have shortest path and highest bandwidth available over the network as in wormhole attack. [19] [20] Limited battery of mobile nodes is one of the arising issues in MANET of which attackers take a lot of advantage. They keep the node awake until its exhausted and go into permanent sleep. [21] The purpose of securing wireless multi hop networks is to prevent misuse of nodes resources and protect the information. Requirements of effective security architecture are authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability and non repudiation. [11] 978-1-5090-5515-9/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE There are two categories of attack in MANET:
A. Active Attacks
Network operations are manipulated due to active attacks. It includes breaking of secured systems through viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc. Malicious code is introduced and information is stolen or modified.
B. Passive Attacks
Passive attack includes receiving data analysis, monitoring of unprotected communications, decrypting weakly encrypted traffic and capturing authentication information such as pass-words, and does not manipulate network activities. [23] [24] [25] II. PROTOCOLS Nodes in MANET can anytime request to connect or leave the network as a result of which their topology changes quite often. If mobile nodes are in same wireless range there is direct communication but if they are not in the same range cooperation from other nodes is required to send messages. Each node in MANET plays two roles: a router and a host. Working as a router each node controls and manages routing path for which it needs certain routing protocols. [22] The basic goals of routing protocols in ad hoc network are to minimize control overhead, packet loss ration and use the energy while maximizing throughput. Since ad hoc networks are used in many different situations, their requirements and complexities are different and hence there are five different categories in which protocols are divided:
• Source-initiated (reactive or on-demand) • Table- 
A. Source Initiated Protocols
In reactive routing, route is created only when the source requests a route to destination. When the request is encountered a route discovery procedure is invoked. The procedure includes flooding of special route request packets to the network starting with immediate neighbours. Active routes are maintained by route maintenance procedure. [12] [13] 
B. Table-Driven Protocols
Proactive protocol is based on the traditional distance vector routing mechanism, called Bellman-Ford routing algorithm. In this protocol routers collect routing information from their neighbours and compute shortest paths to each node. This routing information is then passed to other nodes which in turn update their routing information. This protocol helps in maintaining up-to-date information of all routes from each node to every other node in the network. [6, 14] 
C. Hybrid Protocols
Hybrid protocol is a combination of on-demand and table driven protocol. Proactive routing is used where there are lesser route changes while reactive routing is used in the core of the network. Since this protocol combines the two protocols, the performance can be improved. [12] III. WORMHOLE ATTACK Wormhole attack is one of the most severe attacks on MANET. In this attack two nodes are the attacker nodes also called wormhole nodes. They are connected with each other through a link also called a tunnel. Wormhole attack is therefore sometimes referred as tunnelling attack. Once this link is set up the attacker node overhears the conversation and records the data they hear in the network and forwards it to other attacker node through the tunnel. Chitra Gupta et. al. [51] proposed Wormhole attack is one of the active attacks in which more than one attacker nodes tunnel the traffic from one location to another location in the network. The technique proposed aims at discovering an alternative route to the target node, that route might not be the shortest path, since the shortest path can have the malicious attacker. The implementation of the secure route discovery protocol is performed using NS2 and by modification of the AODV routing protocol. In wormhole attack one to the malicious nodes tunnels the packet of data to the other node through the tunnel. Attackers may use out of band channel, high power transmission, packet relay or encapsulation technique to tunnel packets to colluding nodes. This process makes an illusion, that the nodes that are multi hops apart are immediate neighbours. The wormhole nodes can create a tunnel even for the packets not addressed to them. This is possible because it can overhear the packets in the network due to the nature of the wireless network. The wormhole or the tunnel creates a route that is much smaller than the original route and hence legitimate nodes believe the path through these nodes as the shortest path. This illusion can be used in future to degrade, disrupt, or analyze the traffic stream in the network. This attack is equally harmful for proactive and reactive protocols. If the attacker performs this tunnelling honestly and reliably, no harm is done. The attacker actually provides a useful service in connecting the network more efficiently. However, the wormhole gives a powerful position to the attacker as compared to other nodes, and the attacker can misuse this position. The intruders can at any time manipulate the link as they want. Since the wormhole attack involves off-channel transmission of data, it is very hard to be detected by the nodes participating in the MANET. [26] [27] [28] [29] .
A. Types of Wormhole Modes 1) Packet Encapsulation or In-band Channel:
In this mode one of the attacker nodes takes the packet from a node passing the packet, encapsulates its packet header and sends it to other attacker node. The other attacker node after receiving the encapsulated packet can send it to other nodes or simply drop it. The attacker nodes are within the network.
2) Out of Band Channel:
In this mode the wormhole nodes are connected to each other through an outer link. Wormhole link between the two attacker nodes is created by a channel of high bandwidth placed between the two nodes.
3) High Power Transmission: In this mode when the packet sent by the source node is forced to follow the wormhole link since the attacker node that has captured it transmits it with a high power. In this way it makes the whole traffic to pass through this tunnel. [26] B. Classification of Wormhole Attack: Wormhole attacks can be classified on a number of bases like in the way these nodes are implemented, the medium chosen by these nodes, in the way they attack, on the basis of their visibility. Depending upon whether wormhole nodes put their identity into packets headers when tunnelling (visibility), they are classified as:
• Open wormhole attack/ exposed • Closed wormhole attack/ hidden • Half open wormhole attack
1) Open Wormhole Attack:
Open wormhole attack is also known as exposed attack. In this type of attack, nodes identity is contained in the packet header. The nodes update the packet header and encapsulate its identity (MAC address) when it has a packet to send. After receiving the packet the malicious node includes its identity in the header like all other nodes. Hence the legitimate nodes are aware of the presence of the wormhole nodes but do not know that they are wormhole nodes. These wormhole nodes may not be necessary be malicious. Here both the malicious nodes are visible.
2) Closed Wormhole Attack:
Closed attack is also known as hidden attack. It doesn't affect the packet header at the time of route discovery and hence legitimate nodes don't know its existence. The malicious nodes transmit the packet to its partner node through the tunnel. After the packet is received at the other end the node may drop it or forward it.
3) Half Open Wormhole Attack:
In this attack one malicious node is visible to the legitimate nodes as it updates its entries in the packet header and the other node is invisible. [30] [31] [32] 
IV. WORMHOLE ATTACKS IN VARIOUS PROTOCOLS
A. OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing)
OSLR protocol can be attacked by wormhole attack. Remote nodes may send hello and topology control messages available at its colluding nodes to its own neighbours for dissemination as false information into the network. This will make two faraway nodes to wrongly consider themselves as neighbours, leading to failure of routing protocol. [33] B. DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) DSR is highly vulnerable to wormhole attack and can even lead to DoS attack at the destination. In this attack all RREQ are discarded after the first one for the same route. As we know wormhole creates a faster route and hence RREQ packets through wormhole nodes will reach faster. As a result of this only the route through wormhole nodes will be known as the route to destination. The data packets may be fully or selectively discarded by the wormhole attacker resulting in permanent denial of service attack at the destination. [33] [34] 
C. AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector)
The AODV routing protocol is vulnerable to wormhole attack. Since the attacker nodes involved in wormhole attack uses a high speed channel to send messages, it is possible that the RREQ packet through them reaches the destination faster compared to normal route. According to the protocol, the destination discards all the later RREQ packets received. The destination therefore chooses the false path through wormhole tunnel for RREP. [34] [35] V. DETECTION TECHNIQUES 1) Aarfa Khan, Prof. Shweta Shrivastava and Prof. Vineet Richariya in the year 2014 proposed a detection tech-nique termed as Normalized Wormhole Local Intrusion Detection Algorithm. It is a modification over LID (Local Intrusion Detection) [46] . In this algorithm the node previous to the suspected node performs detection instead of the source node. When the suspected node unicasts the RREP packet it is buffered by the previous node. The previous node then forwards FREQ packet to the next node of the suspected node through a route not passing through suspected node. When the previous node receives FREP from the next node, it behaves according to the information in FREP. If there is a route from next node to intermediate node and destination node the FREP is discarded and the previous node sends RREP to the source. If there is no route from the next node to the intermediate node or/and the destination node, the previous node discards the RREP and the FREP, and broadcasts an alarm message to alert each node of the suspected node. [36] 2) C. P. Vandana and A. F. S. Devaraj in the year 2013 proposed a method that detected wormhole nodes at the early stage of route discovery process in a AODV. This method is known as multi-layered detection mechanism. This method consists of four main layers in the archi-tecture and each layer has a predefined task. [37] 3) Soo-Young Shin and Eddy Hartono Halim in the year 2012 proposed a scheme based on 3 combinational steps which are routes redundancy, routes aggregation, and RoundTrip Time (RTT) calculation. In this scheme AODV protocol is slightly modified. The destination node does not discard all RREQ after the first RREQ as in traditional AODV protocol. The destination sends RREP for all RREQ received after a fixed time from receiving the first RREQ.
Every node broadcasts the RREQ to its 1 hop neigh-bours. This may at some time lead to route redundancy. By the effect of route redundancy, next 1 hop neighbour of two nodes may be same and hence the two routes may follow the same path thereafter. If this happens both the routes are aggregated and the given route contains information of both the routes.
The last stage is the RTT calculation. The RTT calculation is started by the source when it sends RREQ to its 1 hop neighbours. When the source receives RREP form destination, it stamps the calculated RTT for that route or routes (in case of aggregated routes). Next, after waiting for some time after receiving the first RREP, all received routes are listed with their RTT and number of hops. The time for which source waits is 2 x RREP1, where RREP1 is the time source receives first RREP. Next, the source calculates average hop time as:
Average hop time is compared with hop time of transmission. Route, in which both vary by a big number, is found to be malicious. [38] 4) T. Sakthivel and R. M. Chandrasekaran in the year 2012 proposed a path tracing approach to detect and prevent wormhole attacks in MANET. Firstly, the packet header is modified to contain extra bits. Packet header now also contains per hop distance field, prior per hop distance field, timestamp field. As per this approach RTT is calculated by each node based on the time at which RREQ is sent and RREP is received.
RTT = Trep -Treq -INPD
Where, Trep = Time at which first RREP is received, Treq = Time at which first RREQ is sent, INPD = Inter nodal processing delay.
Next, the nodes calculate per hop distance using the calculated RTT. Per hop distance is calculated as:
Where, v = speed of light (It is assumed that the routing signals travel with speed of light). Now, the first node stores this in the headers per hop distance field. The next will store this in prior per hop distance field, calculate its own per hop distance and compare prior per hop distance with per hop distance. If the difference between the two exceeds the threshold, the link with higher hop distance may be a wormhole link.
If the difference comes out to be greater than threshold then frequency of appearance is checked. Frequent appearance count of a link is calculated as:
If this count is greater than the threshold then the link is a wormhole link. So, only if both the conditions are met the link is a wormhole link, else it is not. Once a link is detected as wormhole link, all the nodes are sent a message informing the presence of wormhole link. The nodes store the information in their cache and hence prevent any further communication through this path. [39] 5) K. S. Chan and M. Alam in the year 2011 considered detection of Byzantine wormhole based on an abnormal topology. They assumed that a tunnel is created using more than 2-hop neighbours by the wormhole nodes. Therefore, 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours can be assumed to be trusted. This assumption creates false alarm when the wormhole node is considered to be trusted when its position is at 1-hop distance from source and destination.Detection and isolation of wormhole attackers was not possible by this scheme. Chaki in the year proposed a cluster based counter-measure, WHIDS, to detect worm-hole attack. Simulation was done using MATLAB which exhibited the effectiveness of WHIDS. However, this method does not work in presence of multiple wormhole attacks. [43] 9) Y. Zhou, L. Lamont, and L.Li in [10] proposed a wormhole detection technique which use distance verification. The distance between the sender and the receiver was estimated using RSS (Received Signal Strength). Two approaches namely Hypothesis testing problem and NeymanPearson approach were used to decide whether any node or nodes between the sender and receiver are malicious or not. They assumed that the compromised nodes are static. This assumption did not let the algorithm to be implemented in real world. [44] 10) M.S. Sankaran, S. Poddar, P.S. Das and S. Selvakumar in the year 2009 proposed an algorithm named SaW. Khin Sandar Win in the year 2008 proposed an algorithm named DaW. In both the algorithms similar propositions were made. Only difference between the two was in routing protocols. In SaW AODV was followed while in DaW DSR was followed. Both the papers proposed trust based security models to detect intrusion. If a slink is suspected, the trust information is used to check whether it is wormhole or not. Trust based information is developed based on the packet drop pattern not on the number of drops. Pattern of drops is found using Karl Pearsons formula for correlation. [45] [46] 11) Sun Choi, Doo-young Kim, Do-hyeon Lee and Jae-il Jung in the year 2008 suggested a technique called Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP) based on the use of a timer called Wormhole Prevention Timer (WTP). The technique assumes that the nodes can also listen to the traffic not intended to them, i.e., they can hear the messages even if they are not the recipients. Neighbour node monitoring detects all the neighbours that are not within the transmission range of the node. Transmission range is the one hop range. In this process the node starts the timer after sending RREQ to the neighbour node. Once the RREQ reaches the neighbour node, if it is not the destination node it forwards the RREQ to its neighbours. In turn the node overhears the RREQ. If the overheard RREQ reaches the node before the expiry of WPT, the link is normal. On the other hand if it reaches the node after the expiry of timer, the node assumes the neighbour node to be affected by the wormhole attack. This behaviour of neighbouring node is recorded in the neighbour node table containing RREQ sequence number, neighbour node id, sending and receiving time of RREQ and a counter. The node fills the entry of any neighbour node in the neighbour node table after overhearing RREQ from the node. It then checks nodes for their malicious behaviour. In this way malicious nodes are recorded and avoided for communication in future. The value of Wormhole Prevention Timer (WPT) depends upon whether or not the nodes have mobility. [47] If the nodes are fixed sensor, WPT is given by:
12) Z. Tun and A. H. Maw in the year 2008 introduced a method that used number of neighbours and the round-trip time (RTT) to detect wormhole attacks. A list of neighbours is constructed, path is found between the source and destination, and location link is found based on RTT. They check the number of neighbours and try to find malicious node when RTT is considered to be over limit. They assume that all network builds with the same hardware and software configuration (homo-geneous network), and all nodes are uniquely identified which is unpractical for real-network application. [48] 13) M.A. Gorlatova, P.C. Mason, M. Wang, L. Lamont and R. Liscano in the year 2006 proposed a scheme where detection was done by HELLO control messages. They used the percentage of HELLO Message Timing Inter-vals (HMTIs) within a range as a metric of compliance. The HMTIs were defined to lie in the range R = [T -, T + ]. If they lie within this range, they were said to be valid else out-ofprotocol. Whenever the HMTI packets behaviour is suspicious a secondary check is done. This way, false alarms are avoided. [49] 14) N. Song, L. Qian and X. Li in the year 2005 detected wormhole attack on multipath routing. The source each time floods RREQ in the network. The nodes further forward only the first RREQ they receive. The desti-nation collects all the obtained routes by waiting for RREQ after the first RREQ received by it. Here a new scheme called SAM (Statistical Analysis of Multi-path) was proposed. It uses two parameters Pmax and Ø . Pmax refer to the maximum probability of a link to occur in the set of all obtained routes. Ø refers to the difference between most frequent and second most frequent routes detected by the route discovery process. The higher the values of these two parameters, the higher the risks of wormhole attack. A probability mass function (PMF) was used to verify that Pmax was higher for a system under wormhole attack as compared to a normal system. [50] 15) Tapodhir Acharjee et. al. [52] in the year 2015 proposed a hybrid algorithm that can detect and prevent the wormhole attack and also wormhole link is successfully isolated from the concerned network.
16) Jiu-hu Zheng et. al. [53] has proposed a different detection method which detects wormhole attacks with the connected relation of high connectivity nodes, and thereafter optimizes routing with the help of the normal nodes outside the wormhole. This method has better localisation accuracy as it can well detect wormholes.
17)
Niki Tsitsiroudi et. al. [54] proposed a visual-assisted tool to be developed for exposing security threats in IPenabled WSNs. The proposed tool, was named as called EyeSim, it is a user friendly, human-attractive visual-based anomaly detection system that is capable of alerting and monitoring the presence of wormhole links. The results show that it has the capabilities to accurately detect multiple wormhole attacks in real-time.
18) Juhi Biswas et. al. [55] proposed an algorithm WADP(Wormhole attack detection and prevention) algorithm by making modifications in AODV routing protocol for detection and removal of wormhole attack in real-world MANET. The malicious nodes are detected using Node authentication. Node authentication is also used to remove false positive problem that may arise in WADP algorithm, along with helping in mapping the exact location of wormhole. Thus it is a kind of double verification for wormhole attack detection.
19)
Megha Sharma et. al. [56] used a HMM driven approach, to be applied at an earlier stage of attack to identify the attacked wormhole tunnel pair. The attacked nodes are blocked and thereafter the preventive communication path is formed using fuzzy integrated communication analysis model. The network is simulated in NS2 environment.
20)
Ahmed Louazani et. al. [57] presented a formal model using Time Petri Net to evaluate a proposed solution for detecting wormhole attack in cross-layer MAC protocol (CL MAC) in Wireless sensor networks(WSN).
21)
Meng-Hsiu Jao et. al. [58] proposed a method to detect the wormhole attack without hardware equipment or requiring much information about WSN. A moving average (MA) indicator is used as a dynamic detec-tion indicator of the number of neighbor nodes. The Quantum-inspired Tabu Search (QTS) algorithm is being used to arrange the numerous combinations.
22)
J. Anju et. al. [59] proposed a detection technique for wormhole attack in MANET. This is accomplished in two phases. The preliminary or the first phase is the process of discovering that a wormhole attack is done, it is based on timing analysis and hop count. Once the attack has been suspected, a Clustering based approach is used to confirm the presence of attack, and also to identify the attacker nodes. The network is divided into various clusters and each cluster has a Cluster Head, that controls all the nodes in the cluster and plays the role of a controlling authority in MANET.
23)
Mostefa Bendjima et. al. [60] in order to achieve security and save ad hoc networks from attacks, a technique is proposed in which the network can be split into sectors, and mobile agents (MAs) are used to reject traffic intruders caused by Wormhole attacks considering the energy constraint. 24) Rakhil R. et. al. [61] in the year 2015 presented a novel approach for neighbor discovery and rectifying the effect of wormhole attack. This proposed technique requires no special hardware or expensive mechanisms added to the wireless nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION
A deep study of wormhole attacks in MANET has been done. Wormhole advertises a false shortest path and attracts all the network traffic to it. It has been found that in addition of adding delays in the network, wormhole attacks also decrease the throughput. Various methods and techniques used for the detection and prevention of wormhole attacks such as packet leashes, directional antennas, time-based mechanisms and many other are discussed. A close study has been done on various protocols and attacks in these protocols including OLSR, DSR and AODV protocols. Along with the explanation of these methods we had done qualitative comparison of all the wormhole detection techniques. Overall, a significant amount of work has been done on solving wormhole attack problem. We can't say one solution is applicable to all situations, but we believe that the analysis on different types of wormhole attacks and their detection techniques presented in this paper would be useful to devise stronger detection technique and a suitable solution for preventing Wormhole attack can be proposed.
Few features of MANET like open medium, dynamic change in topology, lack of central monitoring and management, cooperative algorithm, and no clear defense mechanism make it vulnerable to various security attacks [3] .
Wormhole Attack
Wormhole attack is one of the most severe attacks on MANET. It cannot be detected easily because in such an attack two malicious or attacker nodes join together and create tunnels between them. The proposed technique discovers an alternative route to the target node since the shortest path might have the malicious attack [4] . In such an attack, each node acts as a sender or a receiver or a router so it is quite difficult to detect whether the data has been sent or received by the true node or the malicious attacker thus increasing chances of loss of data as well as reception of fake data [5] . Since the wormhole attack involves off-channel transmission of data, it is very hard to be detected by the nodes participating in the MANET. Attackers may use high power transmission, packet relay, or encapsulation technique to tunnel packets to colluding nodes. This process creates confusion, for the nodes that are actually multi-hops apart showing them as immediate neighbors. The wormhole nodes can create a tunnel even for the packets not addressed to them. This tunnel creates a route that is much smaller than the original route, and hence nodes pursue the path through these nodes considering it the shortest path. This illusion can be used in future to degrade, disrupt, or analyze the traffic stream in the network [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
A. Classification of Wormhole Attack
Wormhole attacks can be classified on a number of bases like in the way these nodes are implemented, the medium chosen by these nodes, in the way they attack, on the basis of their visibility. Depending upon whether wormhole nodes put their identity into packets headers when tunneling (visibility), they are classified as:
1. Open Wormhole Attack: Open wormhole attack is also known as exposed attack. In this type of attack, nodes identity is contained in the packet header. Hence, the legitimate nodes are aware of the presence of the wormhole nodes but do not know that they are wormhole nodes. 2. Closed Wormhole Attack: Closed attack is also known as hidden attack. It does not affect the packet header at the time of route discovery, and hence legitimate nodes do not know its existence. 3. Half Open Wormhole Attack: In this attack, one malicious node is visible to the legitimate nodes as it updates its entries in the packet header and the other node is invisible [11, 12] . 
Detection Techniques
Proposed Solution
Here, we propose an algorithm which is an extension of the algorithm using Wormhole Prevention Timer. The previous algorithm was for DSR protocol and suffered from the drawback of overheads due to overhearing of messages by all one-hop neighbors. This algorithm detects wormhole attack using a similar concept as the previous one but works for AODV protocol. Since there is no problem of overhearing in AODV protocol, the overheads due to overhearing are avoided by themselves. We assume there is a queue that stores the value of counters. The counter here denotes the number at which the node is in the path. Therefore, the last value of the counter will give the total number of nodes in the path.
The purpose of using the queue is very straightforward, and queue works in FIFO manner. The values in the queue are thus multiplied in reverse order or we can say that is the order in which the node appears while sending RREP. For example, the value of queue after the destination D receives the RREQ will be 1 2 3 4.
Steps of the algorithm: Timer using following formula WPT = (n*2*TR)/Vp where, n = value at front of the queue TR = Transmission range or one hop distance Vp = Velocity of Packet 5. The time taken for RREP to reach the node back after sending the RREQ is calculated by: Ttaken = TRREP − TRREQ 6. If the time taken exceeds the WPT in the link is suspected to be the wormhole link. The information is broadcasted to the network, The wormhole link is not included in further communications. 7. end for While calculating WPT, C will be the first to receive RREP, and hence value of n for C will be 1, B will be 2. This value of n therefore is a multiplier to calculate time based on the distance. If the value of WPT is less than the time taken then the link is suspected to be wormhole. While if WPT is greater than the time taken then the link is not a wormhole link and is safe to use for communications (Fig. 1) .
The source A first starts sending RREQ to its one-hop neighbor B. A attaches a queue with the RREQ packet to be forwarded. It puts the value 1 in the queue. It also passes a counter initialized to 1 with the packet. The node receiving the RREQ checks if the node itself is the destination node. If it is not the destination node, it forwards the RREQ to its neighbors. It also increments the counter and stores it in the queue. The nodes also keep a record of the time at which they sent the RREQ to their neighbors (Figs. 2 and 3) . Once the RREQ reaches the destination E, it identifies itself as the destination. Next, it starts sending RREP toward the source A through the same route. Once the neighbor D receives the RREP packet, it calculates time taken by RREQ packet to reach E and then RREP to reach it. Then, E calculates WPT by the value in the queue. It then compares the two values calculated by it. Here WPT is larger than the time taken, and hence the link turns out to be safe. If at any node the value of WPT comes out to be smaller than the time taken, or in other words the RREP packet reaches the node after the expiration of WPT, the link is suspected to be wormhole link. The information about wormhole link is broadcasted to the entire network. Thus, any future communication through this link (B C) will be avoided (Figs. 4 and 5) .
The same procedure is followed at all nodes receiving the RREP packet. 
Simulation
A. Simulation Environment
Wormhole attack and our proposed algorithms are implemented in ns-3. For our simulations, we use Traffic type Constant Bit Rate (CBR) application, UDP/IP, IEEE 802.11b MAC, and wireless channel based on random waypoint mobility model. The simulated network consists of 10-50 randomly allocated wireless nodes in a 1000 by 1000 m 2 flat space. Data rate is 2.0 Mb, and the min speed and max speed of nodes are 0.5 and 1.5 m/s, and the no. of wormhole link kept is 0,1. The selected pause time is 10 s.
B. Results and Discussion
Wormhole attack is simulated along with the AODV protocol, and AODV is also simulated without any malicious node, and finally our proposed algorithm is simulated with 0,1 wormhole link in the network, and the performance is measured by performance metrics like average PDR, average EED, normalized routing overhead. As shown in Fig. 6 , the Average packet delivery Ratio is highest when there is no malicious condition. In our proposed algorithm, the result is slight good as compared with the wormhole attack which occurred in the network.
Packet delivery ratio is defined as the ratio of number of packets sent from the sender side and the number of packets actually received by the receiver. As shown in the diagram when the AODV is in wormhole, the average PDR is constantly decreasing with the increasing number of nodes and vice versa is true when the AODV is not in wormhole. By using the proposed algorithm, the average packet delivery ratio can be increased as wormhole nodes will be detected at initial states; then it would not harm the network and cause less damage.
The source-destination pair ratio is always fixed, and with the increasing number of nodes, only the effect of attackers on network parameters is enhanced. As shown in Fig. 7 , the average end-to-end delay of the network increases with the increasing number of nodes because the attackers or wormhole nodes will either drop the packets or they will increase the delay. Thus, the worst case of this situation is shown in the figure when the AODV is in wormhole. By using the proposed algorithm, it can be balanced. In routing, routing overheads contribute the control packets and the route breaks. As per shown in Fig. 8 , the normalized routing overheads are increasing with the increasing number of nodes. Therefore the increased number of nodes will result in more number of control packets for their broadcasting and more route breaks. This algorithm can be used to minimize the number of control packets and to control route breaks, thus resulting in lower routing overheads (Figs. 7 and 8 ). 
Conclusion
In this paper, the various aspects and classifications of a wormhole attack are discussed. The proposed algorithm works for the detection of a wormhole in the network and mechanism to diminish the consequences. This approach works equally well with the defined three classifications of a wormhole attack. Two key points of this algorithm are (1) the timer approach and (2) the queue implementation. The use of the timer approach results in minimum number of overheads which is the basis con in every approach, while the queues work in FIFO manner. Thus, we store the node appearing order in it. This results in the identification of the wormhole attack, and the illusion created by the wormhole nodes can be broken. A threshold value, i.e., Wormhole Prevention Timer value, is calculated according to the mentioned formula. Thus, this algorithm works better in the sense of less number of overheads and the time taken in the detection of a wormhole attack.
